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1. Introduction 
The growing international exchange of products and factors has contributed to the 
strong integration in the Asia and Pacific region that includes countries such as 
Australia, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. In particular, in 
1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand initiated the 
creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), aiming to achieve a 
single common market by 2015 through gradual economic integration. Regional 
integration makes it hard for governments to set their own tax policies without taking 
the neighbouring countries’ tax policies into account. Against this backdrop, this 
paper raises the question, for the first time, of whether tax policies are converging in 
the Asia and Pacific region. 
With increasing capital mobility and foreign direct investment (FDI) across country 
borders, as well as the recognition that FDI may be an important force for economic 
growth, governments in Asia have extensively engaged in strategic tax policies 
designed to attract footloose firms from abroad. This can be a sensible approach in 
economies where sovereign debt is not a problem, and where the benefit of attracting 
foreign corporations might outweigh the reduction in corporate taxes. Stewart and 
Webb (2006) provide us with a thorough survey of theoretical contributions that 
justify the use of taxes by governments to attract corporations and FDI. As the tax 
competition model predicts, governments may strategically compete with each other 
to attract the footloose capital, ceteris paribus, resulting in a downward pressure on 
the corporate tax rate. In a recent contribution, Chen, Huang and Regis (2014) provide 
a theoretical model which, based on economies of agglomeration, explains tax 
competition amongst regions; see also Devereux (2012) and Liu (2014). Hence, the 
convergence of tax rates may well happen as a result of competition to attract foreign 
corporations, which, according to Velayos, Barreix and Villela (2008), is the first step 
on the fiscal harmonization pyramid.  
Since the ignition of the 2008 Great Recession, it has been acknowledged that capital 
inflows may be an important source of credit creation, which may in turn boost 
economic growth, with this having been particularly true before 2008 (Carvalho, 
2014). The rationale behind this is that foreign capital may be used to finance internal 
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spending, in particular in booming sectors, such as the housing market in some 
peripheral European countries. Given that foreign capital has clearly been a cheap 
source of funding for local economies, one way that governments can make it easier 
for foreign companies to establish themselves is to soften their tax burdens. FDI may 
have an important impact on the host economy by means of job creation and 
technology spillovers, which may boost aggregate demand. In a recent paper, Cuestas 
and Regis (2013) analyse the effect of capital inflows on the real exchange rates, and 
vice versa, in a number of East Asian countries, finding that capital mobility is 
significant, and that movements in competitiveness have an impact on capital inflows. 
Since taxes can affect final prices, tax policies may affect the competitiveness of a 
country in terms of attracting foreign capital. 
Tax convergence may well be explained by globalization and economic integration. 
Since 1980, many countries have relaxed the restrictions on capital mobility and have 
tried to integrate themselves into the world economy. Bretschger and Hettich (2002) 
find a negative and significant impact of globalization on corporate taxes for fourteen 
OECD countries. This finding is also in line with the tax law convergence claimed by 
Avi-Yonah (2010). In the past thirty years, consumption value added tax (VAT) has 
been widely introduced by many countries, gradually replacing direct taxes on 
corporate benefits and labour income. This may have enhanced the corporate tax rate 
harmonization.  
There is a large literature on tax competition, economic integration and tax regime 
shifts, all of which may lead to increasing pressure on tax policy harmonization and 
thus provide an explanation for the existence of tax convergence. However, studies on 
tax convergence itself are surprisingly rare. A few papers analyse tax convergence 
using a macro tax burden or fiscal pressure indicator such as the tax revenue. 
Additionally, most are in the EU context, where the process of economic integration 
has accelerated the discussion on fiscal harmonization. Delgado and Presno (2010) 
find little evidence of tax convergence (1965–2005) in the EU-15, using both the 
revenue to the GDP ratio and the tax mix ratios as benchmarks. Becker and 
Elsayyad’s (2009) study, through the introduction of a bilateral similarity index to 
measure the similarity of tax systems conditional on country characteristics, implies a 
slight convergence in OECD tax systems. The main findings from the literature 
indicate that high tax rate countries have cut their taxes the most in the past years, 
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which has led tax rates to converge slightly over time. Recently, Apergis and Cooray 
(2013) show that there is no full convergence of total tax revenues and their 
composition across Asia and Pacific countries in the period 1990-2012; however, club 
convergence is identified, with three or four clubs identified depending on the type of 
revenue studied. However, corporate tax is aggregated together with income tax and 
other direct taxes. 
The literature deals mostly with aggregate tax measures, while we contribute to the 
study of corporate tax specifically, since capital is the most mobile economic factor of 
interest for policy makers. Given the clear path taken by Asian countries towards a 
more integrated region, fiscal harmonization should be on their agenda. Moreover, 
according to Bettendorf et al. (2010), for fiscal harmonization, governments need to 
contemplate not only tax base consolidation, but also rate harmonization. In this study, 
the evidence concerning corporation tax rate convergence is directly tested using a 
sample of fifteen countries from the Asia and Pacific region. Not only is cluster 
analysis performed through the application of the new methodology of panel 
convergence testing proposed by Phillip and Sul (2007, 2009), but beta convergence 
and sigma convergence are also taken into consideration. The results support 
convergence in tax rates across Asian and Pacific countries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the tax data. Section 
3 reviews the most commonly used concepts of beta and sigma convergence and 
presents the regional tax convergence result. This is followed by the identification of 
convergence clubs within the region in section 4. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The data: statutory tax rates. 
In order to assess tax convergence, we need to measure national tax levels that could 
be compared across countries and over time. However, there is no clear-cut way to 
summarize a country’s complex corporate tax system that varies across countries and 
over time. Some countries adopt multiple-rate systems, with specific rates applied to 
certain sectors of the economy, while others may have graduated corporate tax rate 
structures. The problem of developing appropriate measures of taxation is an 
important reason for the lack of empirical evidence on corporate income tax 
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convergence. Three choices of corporate tax rates are generally considered in the 
literature: marginal effective tax rates, average tax rates and statutory tax rates. 
Fullerton (1999) was the first to develop the approach of assessing effective tax rates, 
which is a useful way to assess the micro-level decisions made by companies 
regarding the location of investment. Nonetheless, such estimates are project-specific 
and sensitive to assumptions about economic fundamentals and legislation. Moreover, 
this measure does not account for how a tax system is actually enforced. In the Asia 
and Pacific countries, the data needed to calculate this estimate are difficult to collect, 
making it unavailable for country-level comparisons and the assessment of tax 
convergence over time. Some other researchers, such as Baldwin and Krugman 
(2004), adopt the average corporate tax rate, defined as tax revenues over GDP. 
Criticisms of this measure mainly stem from two reasons. First, an increase in the 
average corporate tax rate may be due to a recession in the business cycle instead of 
an increase in the tax rate. Second, an increase in revenue may be due to the presence 
of more organizations instead of a rise in the corporate tax rate. This is by far the most 
commonly used measure in cross-country studies, including the literature on tax 
burden and the aforementioned tax burden convergence. The alternative choice is the 
statutory tax rate. Arguably, it this may be an inadequate value in that it may fail to 
comprehensively analyse the corporate tax base, including the inventory allowance 
system, inflation adjustment and depreciation schedules, holidays and availability of 
credits to investment, as summarized in Slemrod (2004). However, the legal tax is a 
highly transparent and clear measure of fiscal policy and tax schemes. Thus, we use it 
in this paper as the measure of corporate income taxes.  
Hence, in this study, unlike in previous studies, the variable of interest is the statutory 
tax rate, rather than revenue, the aim being to use a proxy that is simple to interpret 
and independent of business cycle effects. The main source is the World Tax 
Database for the period 1980–2003, expanded when necessary with KPMG corporate 
tax rates (1993–1996) and KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey (1999–
2014). The OECD tax statistics database (1981–2014) is also used, for the four OECD 
countries in our sample. Summary statistics by country in four different years can be 
found in Table 1. 
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3. Tax convergence  
There is a long tradition of researchers studying economic convergence among 
countries, motivated by one of the most fundamental question in macroeconomics: 
Will poor countries catch up with rich countries? Alternative concepts of convergence 
have been developed, such as absolute beta convergence, sigma convergence, 
conditional beta convergence, stochastic convergence, club convergence, etc. The 
consensus is that there is conditional beta convergence across countries and regions, 
where convergence is defined as each economy converging to its own steady state. 
However, conditional convergence does not require convergence in the sense of poor 
countries growing more quickly than rich countries. 
Absolute beta and sigma convergence are more directly related to the original ideas of 
the convergence literature. Also, it is relatively simple to produce graphical 
representations of them. Beta convergence has to do with the degree of convergence 
of a variable to its steady state, depending on its past values or initial value 
(Sala-i-Martin, 1996). In our case, it is given by  
∆tax2014−1980 = α −   β tax1980 + ε                                               (1) 
where ε  is the error term. A significant β  is indicative of beta convergence. 
Convergence in GDP usually is defined with variables in logs; however, our approach 
is to use the original variable since tax rates are measured in percentages making the 
economic interpretation of the results straightforward1. In Figure 1, changes in the tax 
rates are compared with the initial tax rate. The negative slope of the regression line 
shows the absolute beta convergence of corporate tax rates: 
∆ta�x2014−1980 = 7.784 −   0.706 tax1980                    (5.845)     ( 0.157)                     (2) 
Standard errors are given in brackets. The beta convergence coefficient is negative 
and significant at 1%. However, as there are only 15 observations the results should 
be interpreted with caution. In this case, tax convergence has been achieved through 
cuts in statutory tax rates: countries with high tax rates converging to a lower tax rate. 
1 The beta convergence is often measured in a convergence equation in the log form. The study of 
beta-convergence speed in tax rates using logs is less intuitive. a growth rate in the tax rate of 1.8% 
where the average tax rate is 24%. 
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The countries with the highest tax rates in 1980 have cut their taxes the most (e.g. 
China and India), while countries with low tax rates in 1980 (e.g. Hong Kong) have 
barely changed their tax rates. The speed of convergence is around 3.4% per year2 
while the average annual (negative) change is 1.5%. This suggests that tax rates look 
more alike at the end of the period, with fast convergence. 
Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993) argue that sigma convergence is of more interest 
since it looks directly at whether countries are becoming increasingly homogeneous. 
Beta convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sigma convergence as 
can be seen in Furceri (2005) and Young, Higgins and Levy (2008). Sigma 
convergence provides a more accurate indication of convergence since it shows 
whether the dispersion of the distribution is declining over time. The thick line in 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the standard deviation of tax rates. Since the line 
shows a clear negative trend, there is sigma convergence in the full period, with 
something of an upturn in the last 5–8 years. The standard deviation shrinks by almost 
half, which is quite an interesting evolution in the dynamic behaviour of tax rates. 
This result also suggests that countries are more alike at the end of the period, with 
similar statutory tax rates. In 2007, the average tax rate is 28.3% with a typical 
deviation in a country of ±5%. Both figures have decreased from the 1980 figures of 
41% (mean) and 10.8% (standard deviation). The mean tax rate continues to decrease 
until 2014, ending up at 24.3%, while the standard deviation increases to 5.5%. 
 
 
4. Cluster analysis and tax convergence  
The overall picture in the previous section shows strong indications of convergence in 
tax rates. Although convergence has not been rejected, this is not inconsistent with the 
existence of convergence clubs and, if they do exist, it would be of interest to identify 
them. The general trend is down in terms of the dispersion of statutory tax rates; 
however, this can happen in many different ways, and clustering can be used to 
explore heterogeneity patterns across convergence clubs that occur at the same time as 
2 When transformed into logs, it is statistically significant and the speed of convergence is 1.8%. 
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homogeneity is increasing within the clubs. The cluster composition can help us to 
understand some of this heterogeneity. 
4.1. Logt convergence: the logt test 
In cases where convergence has been rejected, some have followed a clustering 
strategy to identify convergence clubs that may explain the overall non-convergence, 
exploring the heterogeneity in the inter-temporal behaviour within the sample. That is, 
the above definitions of convergence may be inadequate when economic 
fundamentals are different across the countries analysed. According to Phillips and 
Sul (2007, 2009), GDP dynamics need to be modeled under the assumption of 
heterogeneity. These authors develop a model whereby the traditional neoclassical 
growth model is modified so as to have different and time-varying technologies, i.e. 
the model incorporates nonlinearities3. This theoretical approach justifies the use of 
statistical methods that provide the ability to identify clusters or clubs of convergence, 
and are not based upon unit root and cointegration analysis. In the case of tax rates, 
the fundamentals behind the long-run differences across clusters could be related to 
the structural characteristics of the countries’ tax systems.  
Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) argue that a panel can be decomposed into two main 
components, 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝑦𝑦𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,� = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                      (3) 
namely, the common component 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  and the idiosyncratic component 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . The 
fundamental idea behind the procedure is to test whether 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 converges to a common 
value, 𝛿𝛿. In order to test this hypothesis, the authors propose the analysis of the 
following semiparametric equation: 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑖𝑖)]𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼                            (4) 
 
where ξit ≈ iid(0,1) across 𝑖𝑖 but weakly dependent over t and σi > 0. According 
to the formulation in equation (4), the key parameters for convergence are α and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖. 
Convergence of δit to δ happens when α ≥ 0, so 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 → 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 when 𝑡𝑡 → ∞, and at 
3 Nonlinear models are popular when analysing issues of economic integration; see Cuestas and 
Mourelle (2011) and Mourelle, Cuestas and Gil-Alana (2011), amongst many others. 
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the same time δi → δ for all 𝑖𝑖. The joint hypothesis 𝐻𝐻0: δi = δ  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 α ≥ 0 can be 
empirically tested by means of the following auxiliary regression: log(𝜎𝜎ℎ 12 𝜎𝜎ℎ 𝑖𝑖2⁄ ) − 2 log[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)] = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑏𝑏 log(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖              (5) 
where  
𝜎𝜎ℎ 𝑖𝑖2 = 1𝑁𝑁∑ (ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 1)2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                        (6) 
is the squared average transition differential, and 
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
𝑁𝑁∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
= 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
𝑁𝑁∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
                                              (7) 
is the relative transition path. Under the null hypothesis of convergence, 𝜎𝜎ℎ 𝑖𝑖2 → 0. 
From equation (5) one can estimate the value of α as α� = 𝑏𝑏�/2. For this estimate of 
α to be valid, it is required that δi = δ since 𝑏𝑏� is estimated to be constant across 
countries4.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis of convergence (𝐻𝐻0: δi = δ  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 α ≥ 0) is a one-sided test 
based on the t-statistic of 𝑏𝑏� , which focuses on the evolution over time of the 
individual transition path compared to the common growth component. This is a time 
series regression where a transformation of the cross-sectional variance of ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
regressed against log(𝑡𝑡), whose coefficient is the one of interest. If, for all economies 
in a convergence club, ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 → 1 as time evolves, then the cross-sectional variance of 
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 converges to zero and there is convergence. Note that, since the logt test is based 
on the variance of the logarithm of the variable of interest, this test is more related to 
sigma than beta convergence.  
The alternative hypothesis includes two general cases: divergence and club 
convergence. If the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected, it may be because 
there is no convergence (α < 0). Alternatively, there is one more interesting case of 
convergence: it may be that α ≥ 0 but not all δi converge to a single δ for all 
4 In addition, Phillips and Sul (2009) claim that, depending on the estimated values of 𝑏𝑏�, one can 
assess whether the processes present absolute convergence, i.e. level convergence, or conditional 
convergence, i.e. convergence in growth rates. Hence, if 𝑏𝑏� ≥ 2 the processes converge in level, 
whereas if 0 ≤ 𝑏𝑏� < 2 the processes present conditional convergence. That is, stronger evidence in 
favour of convergence is required if we are to conclude that there is level convergence. However, note 
that because this is the analysis of a variable that can only assume values between 0 and 100, long-run 
growth may not be realistic. Within this framework, convergence in growth rates would eventually lead 
to either overall or cluster convergence in levels. 
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countries. Here, the variance of ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 converges to a constant rather than zero, which is 
consistent with having two or more convergence clubs in the sample. In other words, 
there are multiple equilibrium values, and different groups of countries converge to 
different ones. Identifying the composition of these groups would help to test whether 
there was within-group convergence. Phillips and Sul (2007) develop a four-step 
clustering algorithm whereby convergence clubs are identified by endogenized 
groupings. The cluster procedure is based on the logt test from equation (5), 
performed iteratively over country subsamples. In step 1, countries are sorted in 
descending order according to the last period of analysis. In step 2, a core of k 
countries of a convergence club is formed, by taking the first two countries in step 1, 
computing the logt-statistic and, if log(t)>-1.65, adding the remaining countries to the 
core one by one in descending order and computing the new logt-statistic until 
log(t)<-1.65. In step 3, the remaining countries are added one at a time and the 
logt-statistic is computed to check whether they can be added to the convergence club. 
In step 4, the logt-statistic is computed for the remaining countries to check whether 
they form a convergence club (i.e. logt-statistic>-1.65). Otherwise, steps 1–3 are 
repeated to check whether there is more than one club. The critical value at 5% is 
-1.65 because the statistic should be distributed as N(0,1) and the alternative is 
one-sided. See Phillips and Sul (2007) for further details.  
 
4.2. Three clusters in the Asia and Pacific region 
The results of our analysis are displayed in Table 2, in which the variable of interest 
(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is defined as the statutory tax rate
5. The last column shows the logt-statistic, 
according to which the null of overall convergence among the 15 countries is rejected. 
This initial result may still be consistent with beta and sigma convergence if there is 
evidence of club convergence. Sigma convergence, for example, does not distinguish 
between overall convergence (long-run variance of 0, i.e. 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖2 → 0 ) and club 
convergence (converging from above to a constant, i.e. 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖2 → 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌2 > 0). This implies 
that the clustering algorithm should be applied recursively until all clubs have been 
identified. Interestingly, the application of the Phillips and Sul (2007) cluster 
5 The variable has not been transformed into its logarithm because it is expressed as a percentage. No 
filter has been use since the business cycle is not a concern. 
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algorithm reveals that there are three clusters: convergence club A with nine countries, 
club B with four countries, and club C, a small cluster of two countries (see column 3 
for their composition). The groups are organized according to their average tax rate in 
the last three years (column 2). Column 5 contains the logt test result, which shows 
that we cannot reject the null of convergence in any of the three cases. This means 
that there is evidence of tax convergence within each cluster.  
Column 4 shows the t-statistic of sigma convergence, for which the null of no log 
time trend in the variance of tax rates (in logs) implies no convergence6. This test is 
based on the similarity of the concepts of logt convergence and sigma convergence. 
According to equation (5), logt convergence looks at whether there is a time trend in 
the time variance of the transition parameter ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. This is the variance of the variable 
of interest 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 normalized by its cross-sectional mean in each period. Other than the 
normalization to the cross-sectional sample average, logt convergence looks like the 
sigma convergence test7 with a particular form of time trend. Since all t-statistics 
reject the null of no convergence at 1%, there is evidence of sigma convergence 
within the clusters. In Figure 2, the evidence of sigma convergence within these clubs 
is even stronger, if anything, than for the full sample. The general convergence trend 
of the full sample is quite similar to that of the largest convergence club A with nine 
countries, but within club A convergence seems to have accelerated since the early 
1990s. Club convergence among the club B countries has been even faster than in 
club A, while club C’s convergence has been the fastest.  
Figure 3 presents the evolution of the relative transition functions ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The analysis of 
the transition curves provides an opportunity to explore the heterogeneity of the 
sample in more detail. Convergence would imply increasing homogeneity of ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 
the curves should concentrate around 1 (which is, by construction, the average value 
of ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). In these graphs the convergence paths are clearly shown and the results 
confirm the results in Table 2. The last of the four graphs depicts the transition curves 
6 The same test for overall sigma convergence reports a t-statistic of -5.93. Tis would be consistent 
with both, convergence to a single tax rate for all countries and club convergence. 
7 The term 2 log[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)] on the left-hand side as a penalty function, which has not been included in 
this sigma convergence test, is another difference, which may be very important in practice. According 
to Phillips and Sul (2007), this improves the performance of the test. It helps the test to distinguish 
between overall convergence (not rejection of the null) and club convergence (rejection). Therefore, we 
do not expect this test to distinguish between sigma and cluster convergence. This would explain why 
overall convergence is rejected by the logt test but not by the sigma convergence test. 
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aggregated at the cluster level, and shows no sign of convergence. Clusters A and B 
are more similar to each other than to cluster C. However, the trend shows that, 
overall, the clusters are becoming more distinctive, if anything. The other three graphs 
show the dynamics within the clusters. The convergence is very fast within cluster C, 
and faster than in the others. One interesting point that can be highlighted from these 
graphs is that cluster convergence for the other two clubs seems to have been faster 
before 2008, and the Great Recession, than after. Clusters A and B show an increase 
in the dispersion after 2008, which may have been motivated by the financial crisis, 
namely through the cutting of rates to attract investment rather than the increasing of 
taxes to balance budgets. The general negative trend of the statutory rate continues, 
driven by countries with low rates, in each cluster. In cluster A, Thailand and Fiji 
reduced their rates from 28% and 30% in 2011 to 20% by 2013, while Taiwan had 
made an 8% tax cut even earlier, in 2010 (to 17%). Taiwan and Thailand, with the 
lowest tax rates in each of these two clusters for most of the period under study, could 
be considered the front runners of tax cuts. 
To formally test convergence without the effect of the financial crisis, we run the 
Phillips and Sul (2007) algorithm for a subsample up until 2007, leaving the years of 
the crisis out of the analysis. The results, which are not reported here for the sake of 
brevity, point to the existence of only two clusters, with Hong Kong and Singapore in 
one cluster and the rest of the countries in the second cluster. The Phillips and Sul 
(2009) test of overall convergence is rejected, meaning that the two clusters cannot be 
merged. It is interesting that clusters A and B from the full sample period have 
merged. 
Finally, to check the robustness of our analysis, we apply Robinson’s (1995) 
multivariate test for fractional integration, based on a semi-parametric approach, 
which allows us both to estimate the differencing parameter and test for the 
hypothesis of their equality among countries. This analysis is based on fractional 
integration methods. A fractionally integrated process is a process whose order of 
integration is any non-integer number between 0 and 1, hence breaking the dichotomy 
of traditional tests for the order of integration of variables I(d), which classify 
variables as I(1) or I(0). We analyse the autoregressive, fractionally integrated, 
moving average ARFIMA(p, d, 0) of the form 
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where )(LpΦ  is a polynomial of order p, with all zeros of )(LpΦ  outside the unit 
circle, and tε  a white noise process. Table 3 displays the results of the estimations. 
The first point to notice is that the estimated parameters are well above 0.5, which is 
indicative of high persistence, meaning that the steady state has not yet been achieved. 
Second, the test for equality of the differencing parameter confirms the results 
obtained in Table 2; i.e. the speed of adjustment is similar within clusters. 
The composition of the clubs is also quite interesting, especially when compared with 
a large international sample (Table 4). Hong Kong and Singapore, the two members 
of club C, are tax haven countries and are special cases8. The taxation policies in tax 
havens behave differently than in non-tax havens, so this must be recognized in our 
analysis. The average statutory tax rate in the last three years of the sample is 16.8%, 
quite low compared to the rest of our sample (6.2%, below club B’s average) and at 
the lower end of international standards (see Table 4). China, Korea and Taiwan are 
the countries of East Asia, a region with important economic and cultural ties. The 
East Asian countries9, together with Malaysia10, make up convergence club B, which 
suggests that the tax convergence of East Asia within the Asia and Pacific region has 
been important, but that tax convergence within the East Asian countries has been 
even stronger and in fact happened earlier. The average tax rate is 23%, which is close 
to the international average11. It is more difficult to find the connection among the 
countries in group A, the largest cluster, since it is a mix of South and Southeast 
Asian countries and countries from Oceania. The 2012–2014 average tax rate of 27.6% 
is the largest among the three, and comparable to moderate to high corporate tax 
8 Low (or nil) corporate tax is a condition but not the essential element of a tax haven. Hong Kong and 
Singapore provide confidential financial and legal services to non-residents and corporations, 
preventing effective information exchange with other countries. The main aim of the tax structure is to 
attract foreign investment. 
9 Japan is also commonly designated to the East Asian region. However, in our analysis, Japan does 
not seem to behave similarly to the other East Asian countries. This may be because the corporate tax 
system in Japan is more complex than in the rest of the region. 
10 It should be noted that China has a strong influence in Malaysia, with 20-25% of the population 
having Chinese ancestors, especially from the Canton region. China and Malaysia have had strong 
commercial links for a long time. However, it may be argued that the cultural and commercial ties that 
Malaysia has with countries such as Indonesia are stronger. 
11 According to Table 4, the global average is around 22.1%, while the OECD (34 countries) and EU 
(28 countries) averages are 23.3% and 21.1%, respectively. 
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countries, such as Italy (27.5%), Norway (28%) and South Africa (28%). However, 
the convergence process here is almost as strong as in clubs B and C. Figure 2 shows 
that the standard deviations of the three groups in 2008 are quite similar, while there 
is a slight increase at the end of the period for clusters A and B.  
With the clusters identified and club convergence confirmed, it is possible to test for 
convergence among the clusters. This is important, since Phillips and Sul (2009) 
recognize that their procedure/algorithm (Phillips and Sul, 2007) may overestimate 
the number of clusters. Hence, they propose a test for overall convergence, which 
allows us to test whether or not the clusters converge amongst themselves. This is the 
same test as was performed within the clusters separately, but now two clusters are 
grouped at the same time. If the logt test supports the hypothesis of overall 
convergence, this will suggest that the countries in the two clusters are also 
converging over time. Therefore, this test is usually considered to be a convergence 
club merging test, from which a larger cluster may emerge in the long run. In column 
6 of Table 2, two logt-statistics of convergence, of clusters A with B and B with C, 
are reported. The overall logt test (column 7) and the cluster transition curves (Figure 
3, panel 4) support the fact that the clusters do not convergence amongst themselves; 
however, the results imply that clusters A and B may be converging12, while cluster C 
is clearly not doing. This suggests that, in the long run, tax rates may become 
homogeneous in the region, with the possible exception of the tax haven economies 
that have a distinctive dynamic from the rest. 
Two strands of the literature may help to explain the existence of tax convergence. 
First, the tax competition literature has proposed that negative trends may be 
explained by the strategic behaviour of governments in competing for the location of 
corporations, such as in Slemrod (2004) and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano 
(2008). In a recent study, Chen, Huang and Regis (2014), using an IV-GMM strategy 
to estimate the national-level tax reaction function, found evidence in favour of tax 
competition in fourteen Asia-Pacific countries, of the sort that would explain the 
negative slopes in Figures 1 and 2. These results, along with ours, suggest that tax 
12 At this point, note that the convergence of clusters A and B would be consistent with the analysis of 
the period 1980-2007 described earlier. 
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competition amongst regions indeed produces a Nash equilibrium (see Taugourdeau 
and Ziad, 2011, and the references therein).  
Second, tax convergence may be part of globalization and economic integration in the 
Asia and Pacific region. Then, tax convergence could be explained as part of a 
cooperative game in which governments recognized the importance of transnational 
enterprises in an integrated world, which would promote a more homogeneous tax 
setting with countries with relatively high corporate taxes cutting their rates. 
Avi-Yonah (2010) identifies two general trends that may explain corporate tax 
convergence in OECD countries, which may equally apply to the Asia-Pacific region: 
the generalization of VAT, partially replacing corporate taxes, and the cross-country 
integration of corporate taxes (e.g. the elimination of double taxation), which may 
have created incentives to homogenize corporate tax regimes. Jogarajan (2012) 
presents a discussion of the network of bilateral tax treaties that has resulted from 
cooperation in the region. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The results show strong evidence of the convergence of corporate tax rates in terms of 
absolute beta and sigma convergence in the full sample of Asian and Pacific 
economies, and if anything even stronger sigma convergence within convergence 
clubs. Cluster analysis shows that there are three such clubs. Club convergence among 
the East Asian countries plus Malaysia has been much faster than within the club 
consisting of a mix of South and Southeast Asian and Oceania countries, while the 
club comprising the two tax havens has seen the fastest convergence. Convergence 
has pushed the statutory tax rate downwards significantly in the region. However, a 
sample of 122 countries in 2013 shows that there is still room for further tax cuts, 
especially in the South and Southeast Asian and Oceania countries (cluster A) but also 
within East Asia (cluster B). Since tax rates are capped from below at zero, further 
convergence can be expected in the near future. 
It is usually the case that global measures of economic convergence fail to find any 
evidence of convergence, especially as defined by beta and sigma convergence. 
Therefore, the literature has developed the idea of convergence clubs, which suggests 
15 
 
that convergence within groups of similar countries is still possible even if overall 
convergence is not achieved. In the case of the corporate tax rate in the Asia and 
Pacific region, this is not the case. Every single piece of evidence analysed supports 
the hypothesis of convergence. This empirical regularity may be one more piece of 
evidence of economic integration in the region. 
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Figure 1: Tax Rate Convergence – Beta Convergence 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Tax Rate Convergence – Sigma Convergence 
 
Figure 3: Relative Transition Curves (within and across clusters) 
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Notes: The lower right graph shows the transition parameters aggregated at the cluster 
level. The other three graphs show the transition parameter within each cluster separately. 
In clusters B and C, labels for each country are provided, while this is not possible for 
cluster A due to the large number of countries. 
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 Table 1: Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -Summary Statistics  
 
 
1980 1991 2002 2014 
 
Mean 
St 
Dev 
      Australia 46.0 39.0 30.0 30.0 
 
36.3 7.8 
China 55.2 40.0 30.0 25.0 
 
37.6 13.3 
Fiji 37.5 37.5 32.0 20.0 
 
31.8 8.3 
Hong Kong 17.0 16.5 16.0 16.5 
 
16.5 0.4 
India 60.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 
 
41.3 13.1 
Indonesia 45.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 
 
33.8 8.5 
Japan 40.0 37.5 30.0 25.5 
 
33.3 6.7 
Korea, Rep 30.0 34.0 27.0 22.0 
 
28.3 5.1 
Malaysia 40.0 35.0 28.0 25.0 
 
32.0 6.8 
New Zealand 45.0 33.0 33.0 28.0 
 
34.8 7.2 
Pakistan 55.0 50.0 45.0 34.0 
 
46.0 9.0 
Philippines 35.0 35.0 32.0 30.0 
 
33.0 2.4 
Singapore 40.0 31.0 24.5 17.0 
 
28.1 9.8 
Taiwan 35.0 25.0 25.0 17.0 
 
25.5 7.4 
Thailand 35.0 30.0 30.0 20.0 
 
28.8 6.3 
        Mean 41.0 34.6 29.8 24.3 
   St Dev 10.8 7.5 6.2 5.5 
   Sources: the World Tax Database (1980–2003), expanded by KPMG corporate tax rates 
(1993–1996) KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey (1999–2014) and the OECD 
tax statistics database (1981–2014) for the four OECD countries. 
 
 
22 
 
Table 2: Club Convergence 
 
  Sigma  logt test 
 
[1] 
Tax rate 
mean 
[2] 
Countries 
 
[3] 
converg. 
test 
[4] 
Cluster 
converg. 
[5] 
Cluster 
merging 
[6] 
Full sample 
converg. 
[7] 
Cluster A 27.6% Australia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand (-3.74)*** 
0.291  
 (1.191) -0.155  
 
Cluster B 23% China, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan (-5.35)*** 
0.315 (-0.874) -0.394  
(0.622) -0.201 (-4.085)*** 
Cluster C 16.8% Hong Kong, Singapore (-3.25)*** 
2.889 (-2.141)*** 
 (4.924 )  
 Notes: Columns have been numbered from [1] to [7]. In the second column, the club average tax rate across the last three years can be found. The last 
three columns contain the logt convergence test: (within) cluster convergence, cluster merging and overall convergence. In the logt test, a one-sided test 
with critical values of -2.33, -1.65 and -1.28 (at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively), the null hypothesis implies convergence. Column 4 
tests for within-cluster sigma convergence, where rejection of the null implies convergence. Sigma convergence is tested through the t-stat of 𝑏𝑏� in the 
following linear regression: log(𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖2 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌 12⁄ ) = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑏𝑏 log(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, mimicking the logt-statistic (however, note that this is the variance of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  rather than 
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and the log[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)] correction term is not included), where a significant negative trend implies convergence. All values in parentheses are 
t-statistics with Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors, of Newey-West type (truncation parameter of 3). ***, **, * 
stand for 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels. 
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Table 3: Estimated d parameters for each cluster 
 
Cluster A: 
Test for equality of d coefficients:   F(8,207) =  0.53196   Prob > F = 0.8317 
 
Cluster B: 
Country Estimated d t-statistic 
China 0.742 6.032 
South Korea 0.865 7.029 
Malaysia 0.772 6.273 
Taiwan 0.615 4.997 
Test for equality of d coefficients:   F(3,92) =  0.70401   Prob > F = 0.5520 
 
Cluster C: 
Country Estimated d t-statistic 
Hong Kong 0.609 4.770 
Singapore 0.785 6.147 
Test for equality of d coefficients:   F(1,46) =   0.9483   Prob > F = 0.3352 
 
  
Country Estimated d t-statistic 
Australia 0.707 5.596 
Fiji 0.709 5.611 
India 0.692 5.477 
Indonesia 0.692 5.167 
Japan 0.827 6.545 
New Zealand 0.630 4.990 
Pakistan 0.631 4.996 
Philippines 0.783 6.197 
Thailand 0.511 4.045 
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Table 4: Corporate tax, statutory rates in 2013 (%) 
Country Rate Country Rate Country Rate Country Rate 
Utd Arab Em 55.0 New Zealand 28.0 UK 23.0 Hong Kong 16.5 
Angola 35.0 Norway 28.0 Botswana 22.0 Romania 16.0 
Argentina 35.0 South Africa 28.0 Ecuador 22.0 Canada 15.0 
Honduras 35.0 Sri Lanka 28.0 South Korea 22.0 Georgia 15.0 
Malta 35.0 AP-Club A 27.6 Sweden 22.0 Germany 15.0 
Pakistan 35.0 Bangladesh 27.5 Syria 22.0 Kuwait 15.0 
Sudan 35.0 Italy 27.5 Estonia 21.0 Latvia 15.0 
United States 35.0 Samoa 27.0 Luxembourg 21.0 Lithuania 15.0 
Zambia 35.0 Greece 26.0 Afghanistan 20.0 Mauritius 15.0 
France 34.4 Zimbabwe 25.8 Armenia 20.0 Serbia 15.0 
Brazil 34.0 Japan 25.5 Cambodia 20.0 Jordan 14.0 
Venezuela 34.0 Austria 25.0 Croatia 20.0 Cyprus 12.5 
Belgium 33.0 Barbados 25.0 Fiji 20.0 Ireland 12.5 
Namibia 33.0 Bolivia 25.0 Iceland 20.0 Liechtenstein 12.5 
Mozambique 32.0 China 25.0 Kazakhstan 20.0 Macao 12.0 
Guatemala 31.0 Colombia 25.0 Libya 20.0 Oman 12.0 
Australia 30.0 Denmark 25.0 Russia 20.0 Albania 10.0 
Costa Rica 30.0 Egypt 25.0 Saudi Arabia 20.0 Bosnia & Herz 10.0 
El Salvador 30.0 Indonesia 25.0 Thailand 20.0 Bulgaria 10.0 
India 30.0 Israel 25.0 Turkey 20.0 Gibraltar 10.0 
Kenya 30.0 Jamaica 25.0 Yemen 20.0 Macedonia 10.0 
Malawi 30.0 Malaysia 25.0 Czech Rep 19.0 Paraguay 10.0 
Mexico 30.0 Netherlands 25.0 Hungary 19.0 Qatar 10.0 
Nigeria 30.0 Panama 25.0 Poland 19.0 Montenegro 9.0 
Papua New G 30.0 Portugal 25.0 Ukraine 19.0 Switzerland 8.5 
Peru 30.0 Trinidad & T 25.0 Belarus 18.0 Bahamas 0.0 
Philippines 30.0 Uruguay 25.0 Chile 17.0 Bahrain 0.0 
Spain 30.0 Vietnam 25.0 Singapore 17.0 Bermuda 0.0 
Tanzania 30.0 Finland 24.5 Slovenia 17.0 Cayman Is. 0.0 
Tunisia 30.0 AP-Club B 23.0 Taiwan 17.0 Isle of Man 0.0 
Uganda 30.0 Slovak Rep 23.0 AP-Club B 16.8 Vanuatu 0.0 
Dominican R 29.0 
  
  
  Notes: The sample has 122 countries. Countries in bold feature in our analysis. The average tax rates of 
the three convergence clubs from Table 2 have also been included. 
Sources: OECD and KPMG. 
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